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What	  follows	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  basic	  principles	  pertaining	  to	  the	  definitions	  used	  in	  constructing	  
an	  ontology.	  A	  definition	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions.	  What	  this	  means	  
in	  the	  simplest	  case	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  follows.	  To	  say	  that	  ɸ-­‐ing	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
being	   an	   A	   is	   just	   another	   way	   of	   saying	   that	   every	   A	   ɸ’s;	   to	   say	   that	   ɸ-­‐ing	   is	   a	   sufficient	  
condition	  for	  being	  an	  A	  is	  just	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  everything	  that	  ɸ’s	  is	  an	  A.	  The	  goal	  
in	  writing	  a	  definition	  is	  to	  specify	  a	  set	  of	  conditions	  of	  this	  sort	  which	  are	  all	  necessary,	  and	  
which	  are	  jointly	  sufficient.	   	  
The	   following	   is	   a	   set	   of	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   being	   a	   triangle	   which	   are	   also	   jointly	  
sufficient,	  and	  which	  thus	  form	  a	  definition:	  
X	   is	  a	   triangle	  =def.	  X	   is	  a	   closed	   figure;	  X	  has	  exactly	   three	   sides;	  each	  of	  X ’s	   sides	   is	  
straight;	  X	  lies	  in	  a	  plane.	  
Everything	  which	   satisfies	   all	   of	   the	   conditions	   on	   the	   right	   hand	   side	   is	   also	   a	   triangle.	   And	  
everything	  which	  is	  a	  triangle	  satisfies	  all	  of	  these	  conditions.	   	  
Not	   every	   statement	   of	   necessary	   and	   jointly	   sufficient	   conditions	   is	   a	   definition.	   1.	   The	  
statement	   of	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   used	   to	   define	   the	   term	  A	   should	   itself	   use	  
terms	  which	  are	  easier	  to	  understand	  than	  (and	  are	  logically	  simpler	  than)	  the	  term	  A	  itself.	  2.	  
The	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   must	   be	   satisfiable;	   that	   is,	   there	   must	   be	   actual	  
examples	   of	   entities	   which	   satisfy	   the	   definition.	   Thus	   we	   cannot,	   for	   example,	   define	   a	  
perpetual	  motion	  machine	   as	   a	   prime	   number	   that	   is	   divisible	   by	   4,	   even	   though	   everything	  
which	  is	  a	  perpetual	  motion	  machine	  is	  also	  a	  prime	  number	  that	  is	  divisible	  by	  4.	   	  
A	  useful	  template	  for	  creating	  definitions	  along	  the	  lines	  described	  above	  is	  provided	  by	  what	  
are	  called	  Aristotelian	  definitions,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  definitions	  of	  the	  form	  
S	  =def.	  a	  G	  which	  Ds	  
where	  ‘G’	  (for:	  genus)	  is	  the	  parent	  term	  of	  ‘S’	  (for:	  species)	  in	  some	  ontology.	  Here	  ‘D’	  stands	  
for	   ‘differentia’,	  which	   is	   to	  say	   that	   ‘D’	   tells	  us	  what	   it	   is	  about	  certain	  Gs	   in	  virtue	  of	  which	  
they	   are	   Ss.	   An	   example	   Aristotelian	   definition	   (from	   the	   Foundational	   Model	   of	   Anatomy	  
Ontology):	  
cell	  =def.	  an	  anatomical	  structure	  which	  consists	  of	  cytoplasm	  surrounded	  by	  a	  plasma	  
membrane	  
plasma	  membrane	  =def.	  a	  cell	  part	  that	  surrounds	  the	  cytoplasm	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The	  benefits	  of	  using	  Aristotelian	  definitions	  are	  1.	  That	  each	  definition	  reflects	  the	  position	  in	  
the	  ontology	  hierarchy	   to	  which	   the	  defined	   term	  belongs.	   Every	  definition,	  when	  unpacked,	  
takes	  us	  back	  to	  the	  root	  node	  of	  the	  ontology	  to	  which	  it	  belongs.	  2.	  Circularity	   is	  prevented	  
automatically.	   3.	   The	   definition	   author	   always	   knows	   where	   to	   start	   when	   formulating	   a	  
definition.	  4.	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  coordinate	  the	  work	  of	  multiple	  definition	  authors.	   	  
Aristotelian	   definitions	   work	   well	   for	   common	   nouns	   (and	   thus	   for	   the	   names	   of	   types	   or	  
universals	   by	   which	   ontologies	   are	   principally	   populated).	   They	   do	   not	   work	   at	   all	   for	   those	  
common	  nouns	  which	  are	  in	  the	  root	  position	  in	  an	  ontology,	  for	  here	  there	  is	  no	  parent	  term	  
(no	  genus)	  to	  serve	  as	  starting	  point	  for	  definition.	  Root	  nodes	   in	  an	  ontology	  must	  therefore	  
either	  be	  defined	  using	  as	  genus	  some	  more	  general	  term	  taken	  from	  a	  higher-­‐level	  ontology	  
such	  as	  BFO,	  or	  they	  must	  be	  declared	  as	  primitive.	  Primitive	  terms	  cannot	  be	  defined,	  but	  they	  
can	  be	  elucidated	  (by	  means	  of	  illustrative	  examples,	  statements	  of	  recommended	  usage,	  and	  
axioms).	  
Note	  that	  the	  Aristotelian	  rule	  will	  bring	  the	  benefits	  mentioned	  above	  only	  if	  the	  ontology	  in	  
question	   satisfies	   the	  principle	  of	   single	   inheritance,	  which	   is	   to	   say,	  only	   if	   each	   term	   in	   the	  
ontology	  has	  at	  most	  one	  parent.	  For	  only	   thus	   is	   the	  choice	  of	   ‘G’	   for	  each	  given	   ‘S’	  unique.	  
Single	  inheritance	  itself	  however	  brings	  multiple	  benefits	  to	  ontology	  authoring:	  1.	  It	  prevents	  a	  
number	   of	   common	   errors	  which	   derive	   from	   the	   tendency	   once	   dominant	   among	   ontology	  
authors	  of	  what	  has	  been	  called	  “is-­‐a	  overloading”.	  2.	   It	  promotes	   integration	  of	  an	  ontology	  
with	  its	  neighboring	  ontologies.	  3.	  It	  promotes	  forking	  of	  ontologies.	  4.	  The	  benefits	  of	  multiple	  
inheritance,	  for	  example	  in	  terms	  of	  surveyability	  of	  an	  ontology	  (so	  that	  it	  is	  easier	  for	  human	  
beings	   to	   find	   the	   terms	   they	  need)	   can	  be	  gained	   in	  any	   case	  by	   formulating	   the	  official	   (or	  
‘asserted’)	  version	  of	  an	  ontology	  as	  an	  asserted	  monohierarchy	  and	  allowing	  the	  development	  
of	  inferred	  polyhierarchies	  for	  specific	  groups	  of	  users.	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